The South African Truth Commission by Dale, Richard
The South African Truth Commission 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.   Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of South Africa. Report. 5 volumes.  Cape Town: The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 1998.  
Jeffery, Anthea. The Truth about the Truth Commission. Spotlight Series no. 3/99. 
Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1999. 
Shea, Dorothy C.  The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of 
Reconciliation.Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000. 
Although the name Desmond Tutu may not be as familiar to the attentive public in the 
West as the name Nelson Mandela, the former (Anglican) archbishop lent the moral 
stature of his Nobel Peace Prize (awarded in 1984) to this collective political, moral and 
legal enterprise which, to a large extent, replicated some of the graciousness and 
magnanimity that President Mandela has shown to his erstwhile foes. Seen in a larger, 
comparative context, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), chaired by 
Desmond Tutu, represents an effort to confront the past record of an authoritarian regime 
that is shifting into a democratic present and future, as is the case with some Latin 
American and Eastern European polities. This is never an easy task and entails trauma, 
anger, frustration and disappointment for the participants, many - if not most - of whom 
had been regime subjects rather than stakeholders in the previous regime. In the South 
African case, the operating costs of the commission were appreciable, although the 
Mandela government enjoyed the financial patronage of several friendly states that 
helped to defray some of the commission’s expenses (Report, vol. 1, p. 20). Indeed, the 
TRC had a staff of about 400 persons (Shea, p. 64).There has been a continuous stream of 
publications about this commission, so that this review covers only a portion of the 
pertinent and available literature, which spans a range of disciplines from autobiography 
to comparative political science, jurisprudence and political philosophy, in addition to 
journalism.1   At the nub of the TRC’s inquiry is an analysis of the nature and human 
costs of the entrenched, wide-ranging and pervasive pattern of white minority domination 
known since 1948 by its Afrikaans name, apartheid. White domination, often part and 
parcel of colonial rule, is hardly unique, but it had no equal in South Africa whose ruling 
elite elevated it to both a way of life and an elaborate (if not specious) philosophical 
construct (called separate development by its principally Afrikaner designers). The 
United Nations, especially its General Assembly, has kept a watching brief on the 
implementation and human rights ramifications of the apartheid system, along with 
issuing continuing, acerbic evaluations, usually in the form of resolutions, which the 
Pretoria regime routinely ignored. But with the commission report there is an internally 
produced assessment of the regime, characterized by the TRC as “a criminal state.” 
(Jeffery, pp. 13 and 114). 
The five-volume study, as both Jeffery (p. 43) and Shea (p. 57) rightly stress, lacks an 
index, making it difficult for many scholars to use unless they construct their own index 
to fit their peculiar   research needs, and its citations (in the footnotes) are not as complete 
as they should be for those who wish to use the report as reference guide. Another 
shortcoming of the commission report, probably explained by escalating printing costs, is 
the lack of an appendix providing relevant portions (if not the full text) of the enabling 
statute, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act no. 34 of 1995, under 
which the commission was established. Nor does the report provide a cogent synopsis of 
the parliamentary debate concerning the passage of this crucial act (which lasted some 
300 hours, Shea, p. 12). There is, however, a TRC web site (www.truth.org.za) so that 
interested researchers can stay au fait with ongoing developments (Shea, p. 106, n. 11).  
For many, probably the most effective way of reading, absorbing and assessing the 
commission report is to begin with Dorothy C. Shea’s succinct summary, which, sadly, is 
bereft of an index. A US Foreign Service Officer, who served in South Africa and 
subsequently headed the multilateral and humanitarian affairs section of the National 
Security Council, Shea is used to terse, crisp diplomatic reporting, and her prose is lucid 
and pithy.  She also has a keen appreciation of what the commission’s activities and 
report signify in a larger, comparative international context, such as that found in Samuel 
P. Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
The TRC report can be regarded in different lights: as a morality play, as a catalogue of 
sordid human rights abuses, as an interracial and interethnic discourse, as a quantitative 
and qualitative recounting of torture and atrocities, as a mea culpa for individual South 
Africans, as a damning indictment of white domination as practiced in a whole range of 
social institutions, as an exposŽ of police and defense force sub rosa activities and as the 
politics of silence, remonstrance, shame and complicity. At its most compelling, it is a 
genre of national autobiography (leaving aside the nettlesome methodological issue of 
reification), and it might serve as a model for other nations (Shea, p. 5 and 77) struggling 
with the comparable legacies and carrying equivalent human rights abuse baggage. 
The TRC had to cope with some of the issues that faced Western European nations in 
1945 regarding the culpability of their own citizens during the humiliating German 
occupation. Vichy and Quisling are probably the two obvious code words, although the 
process of reexamining the recent past was not restricted to France and Norway, 
respectively.2  South Africa’s case was a bit more opaque than the German-occupied 
nations for at least four reasons.  First, the TRC’s mandate covered a longer period 
(1960-94 [Report, vol. 1, p. 24]) than the span of World War II (1939-45). Second, the 
TRC decided to dispense with the system of lustration (Report, vol. 1, p. 3), which was 
applied in France under the title of indignite national.3  In the idiom of George Orwell, 
the TRC created no unpersons. Third, the TRC handed down no specific criminal 
sentences, especially capital punishment (which is proscribed in post-apartheid South 
Africa), as was true in France and Norway, for example.4  Rather, the TRC offered a 
series of findings or conclusions after sifting and considering the evidence before it 
(Report, vol. 5, pp.  196-258). One of its subsidiary bodies dealt with the political hot 
potato of amnesty for individuals (Report, vol. 5, pp. 108-124). Finally, as the TRC itself 
explained, the entire process was a negotiated one, a tradeoff reflecting the strengths of 
the several contestants for state power and legitimacy, and hence precluded using the 
Nuremberg model (of the International Military Tribunal) (Report, vol. 1, pp. 5 and 118). 
Such was not the case after V-E day in 1945, where there was a transparent German 
surrender. 
What is noteworthy about the TRC report is its consideration of organizational behavior 
during the mandate period (Report, vol. 4, pp.  18-219), asking essentially what the 
institutions did to accommodate, resist or circumvent the ubiquitous apartheid policies, 
thus approaching the fundamental query, namely, how did apartheid happen? This, in 
turn, entails the profoundly challenging issue of both individual and group moral 
responsibility in civil society, to say nothing of the complexities of assigning causal links 
in the transition from a relatively ad hoc, informal system of white minority rule prior to 
1948 (when the National Party assumed power after a hard-fought election) to the all-
pervasive, finely-tuned, and bureaucratic behemoth that followed in the wake of that 
election (and subsequent elections which consolidated Afrikaner nationalist hegemony). 
This leads to the demanding task of providing an exegesis of South African political 
engineering. 
An intriguing aspect of the TRC’s work was the holding of public hearings at which 
some citizens recounted the (often appalling) details of human rights abuse - often to 
themselves, but frequently to their deceased family members - according to their 
understanding of “the truth.”   What distressed some of the critics of the TRC, especially 
Jeffery (a human rights lawyer by professional training), was the lack of rigor and often 
untested standard of such “truth” (Jeffery, pp. 10-11 and 68-70). The commission was not 
intended to be yet another judicial entity, which had a different modus operandi, different 
examining procedures and protections for defendants; rather, it might be better thought of 
as a quasi-judicial body. The TRC, in effect, was an adjunct to the judicial system, and 
did not consistently and systematically operate according to all the accepted precepts of 
civil and criminal law (Jeffery, pp. 117-28). Through one of its committees, it was 
empowered to grant amnesty to individuals under certain conditions, which entailed full 
disclosure as well as a demonstrable political motive underlying the commission of the 
grievous act(s).        
Although it did acknowledge that there were several layers of meaning to “the truth” 
(Report, vol. 1, pp. 110-14), the commission was able to explore the mindsets of the 
perpetrators of these human rights abuses, often through amnesty hearings.  Members of 
the South African Police Force tended to be more cooperative and forthcoming than those 
of the South African Defense Force (SADF).5  The Defense Force was one of the 
recalcitrant organizations from the perspective of the TRC, which emphasized how much 
of the historical record was lost by the deliberate destruction of the military records 
(Report, vol. 1, pp. 222-24). Still, there are significant revelations about the 
extraterritorial (including covert) operations of the SADF, which often supplemented 
those of the police (Report, vol. 2, pp. 42-164). 
Such unsavory activity, however, was not the monopoly of any one particular institution, 
and the TRC took note of the human rights abuses committed by the premier liberation 
group, the African Nationalist Congress (ANC), in its extraterritorial staging area and 
camp in Angola and called it to task for such treatment. Neither the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) nor the Inkatha Freedom Party (a vehicle for Zulu particularism) - the 
major rivals of the ANC - escaped chastisement from the TRC. These matters bore on the 
question of how balanced or even-handed the TRC was in the apportionment of blame or 
responsibility for violating international human rights norms, a topic which both Shea 
(pp. 58 and 74-75) and Jeffery (pp. 11-12 and 103-106) consider to some extent. Jeffery 
observed (pp. 77, 101, 104-106, and 162-163) that the TRC had not delved deeply 
enough into the theory and practice of the ANC’s “just war” or “people’s war” doctrine 
underlying its multifaceted battle against the apartheid regime, and she was dismayed by 
the methodological and jurisprudential inconsistencies and inadequacies that surfaced in 
the amnesty hearings (pp. 49-67 and 76-78). 
Obviously, the TRC had its flaws and its detractors (who ranged all over the ideological 
spectrum), and it had to develop a methodology and data base (see Report, vol. 1, pp. 
135-73) that would support the work of the commissioners and presumably stand the test 
of time as well as be applicable throughout the various regions of the nations where it 
held hearings and where its writ ran (see Report, vol. 3, pp. 34-745). At the more 
philosophical level, it needed to address the more vexing question of whether there was a 
“moral equivalence” between the (liberation) forces arrayed against, and those (state-
sponsored) forces in support of, the South African regime during the period it was 
investigating (Shea,  pp. 38 and 74).   Nevertheless, the creation of the TRC will rank as a 
monumental achievement, an exemplar of moral and political courage, and a landmark 
both in South African politics and in the wider arena of the study of political transitions 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Its report deserves to be carefully read and 
pondered. 
Richard Dale 
Fountain Hills, Arizona 
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